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IN DEDICATION TO DEAN DILLARD:
MAN OF DEPTH AND STYLE
FOREWORD
Myres S. McDougal* & Harold D. Lasswell**
T is eminently fitting that an issue of the Virginia Law Review
designed to make a serious contribution to legal education should
be dedicated to Dean Hardy Dillard. For some forty years Dean Dillard
has been a distinguished leader in the pioneering efforts in this country
to create a more realistic and viable jurisprudence and to put that
jurisprudence into effective application in improved legal education.
It would be as impossible as unnecessary even to attempt here
to describe the many different roles in which Dean Dillard has asserted
leadership. Throughout his career he has been a powerful teacher, both
in the classroom and in other associations, greatly affecting the more
fundamental perspectives of all his audiences. His scholarly publications
upon subjects of the greatest variety-international law, jurisprudence,
contracts, torts, general philosophy, legal education, and so on-have
since the early thirties poured forth in steady and, happily, increas-
ing volume. For these several decades, first as an influential member of
the faculty and more recently as dean, he has had a major hand in
shaping the destinies of a great national law school.' In a time of urgent
national crisis he took the indispensable initiative in establishing an im-
portant, and enduring, center for training and inquiry in military law
and government. He has represented and advised his government on
matters of the highest importance both as a military officer and as a civil-
ian. He has been active in the professional organizations of the bar, at
both national and local levels, and has held high executive position in
influential private associations, such as the American Society of Interna-
*Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., 1926, MA., 1927, LL.B, 1935,
University of Mississippi; B.A. in Jurisprudence, 1929, B.C.L., 1930, Oxford; J.S.D, 1931,
Yale University.
* * Ford Foundation Professor of Law and the Social Sciences, Yale University. Ph.B.,
1922, Ph.D., 1926, University of Chicago.
1 Despite his success as a dean, many of us still find it difficult to put Dean, rather
than Professor, before DUllard. The public image of him as a teacher entirely cor-
responds to the emphasis in his formal title of James Monroe Professor of Law and
Dean.
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tional Law and the Association of American Law Schools. He has lec-
tured in great universities abroad and served as consultant to large phil-
anthropic foundations. Finally, as inimitable friend and mentor, he has
stimulated many associates to enlarge their aspirations and capabilities
and, hence, to make contributions which might otherwise have been be-
yond them. To the performance of all these different roles, it must be
added, Dean Dillard has brought, in a manner quite distinctive to him,
the deepest empathy for his fellowman, an abundance of wit and
humor, and an extraordinary grace and felicity in styleY
The preeminent contribution of Dean Dillard has been perhaps in
shaping the perspectives of lawyers and scholars about who they are and
what their appropriate responsibilities and tasks are. In his conception,
law is not something autonomous and apart, but an integral and im-
portant component of social process, directly affecting the quality of
the public order a community can establish and maintain; correspond-
ingly, it is the responsibility of the lawyer, as a skilled generalist in the
management of processes of authoritative decision, to take an enlightened
view of the aggregate consequences of the exercise of his skills and to
employ such skills in promotion of both minimum and optimum order
in all the communities which he serves. Thus, in insisting that the United
Nations "is not simply a political tool expressing the interests of the
component powers but is, in fact, a law-creating and law-enforcing
body," he writes in generalization about all law:
The point seems to me to need stressing since it is so frequently mis-
understood. It is misunderstood because of the over-emphasis, in legal
and political thinking, of law as merely a body of norms which are
somehow established by custom or created by a legislature and then
applied by a court. Law does not exhaust its function merely by set-
tling disputes. It has an "order-creating" or "constitutive" function
as well; it performs this function by fashioning new patterns of rela-
tions.3
Similarly, "the lawyer's role," he affirms, "is that of a generalist among
specialists" and "the theoretician's role is to create models in which
norms and institutions are prudentially tailored to needs." 4 In more de-
tail he explains:
2 These distinguishing characteristics are happily emphasized in Schachter, Towards a
Theory of International Obligations, 8 VA. J. INf'L L. 300 (1968).
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The professional role of the lawyer is, of course, multidimensional.
Apart from serving clients and government in ways that are both
traditional and familiar he is now confronted with a multitude of
emerging problems challenging both his craftsmanship and imagination.
The uses of atomic energy; space and outer space activities including
meteorological investigations, satellites and communication problems;
special trade and investment dilemmas raised by the European Com-
mon Market; and potential controls for limitations on armaments-
to mention only a few of the more dramatic areas-are already taxing
the resourcefulness of our profession. Nor is this all. Many traditional
areas need the kind of re-examination which lawyers (working with
men from other disciplines) should be equipped to provide. The im-
pact of automation on labor-management relations; the gap in knowl-
edge and understanding between economists and tax lawyers; the
need for ancillary devices to ease racial tensions in a multitude of
contexts-these challenges cut across a wide area of social life which is
embraced within the lawyer's sphere of professional effort.5
Not unmindful of the "nuts and bolts" with which lawyers are some-
times obsessed, he would extend his concern beyond the reverent modi-
fication of traditional technicalities to considerations of grand strategy;
he would, in paraphrase of a famous encomium, greatly learn and
greatly teach.
It would do violence to fact, and possibly to Dean Dillard's sensibili-
ties, to suggest that he has ever purported explicitly to project a compre-
hensive theory about law. He has many times expressed wariness about
pretentious and over-elaborate systems, and he would probably regard
any effort to impose a programmatic framework upon his expressed in-
sights as an obnoxious form of intellectual hubris. It is believed, nonethe-
less, that even a modest sampling of his writings must reveal that he has
contributed important clarifications to all the major features of a con-
textual, problem-solving, multi-method jurisprudence which could
greatly facilitate the acquisition and communication of policy relevant
knowledge about the reciprocal impacts of legal process and social proc-
ess. Such clarifications can be traced through the observational stand-
points he identifies, the comprehensiveness and realism of the major
focus of inquiry he recommends, the range of relevant intellectual tasks
he specifies, and the explicitness which he demands in the postulation
of basic public order goals." It is conceivable that Dean Dillard has built
5 Dillard, Law and Learning, 49 VA. L. REv. 647, 655 (1963).6These criteria are developed in more detail in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman,
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more comprehensively than he has been willing deliberately to make ex-
plicit; it may not be without significance that one* of his favorite stories,
when turned against others, -relates to "a little sign, a kind of bright
thought for the day, outside a Unitarian church near London" which
reads "'between scepticism on the one hand and dogmatism on the
other hand, there is a middle way, which is our way-open-minded cer-
tainty.'" 
In his identification of observational standpoints, Dean Dillard clearly
distinguishes the perspectives of the authoritative decision-maker, pri-
marily interested in making power choices in conformity with basic
community policies, from those of the scholar, primarily interested in
enlightenment about both the aggregate and particular interrelationships
of authoritative decision and other aspects of community process. He
often insists that the scholar must work sub specie aeternitatis, and he
recognizes that the scholar must aspire to a theory more comprehensive
than that of claimants and decision-makers if he is to establish criteria for
appraising claims and decisions. Thus, he writes:
The power to generate new thought is quite different from the
use of judgment involved in pure synthesizing research or the use
of the critical faculties in analytical dissection. It not only implies
a willingness to challenge old assumptions, it also involves a capacity to
fashion new theories through which to view and select facts and even
a capacity to shift categories, so that matters which were once classi-
fied as similar appear less so, and conclusions once thought compelled
by logic appear no longer so compelled.8
The difficulty in maintaining this observational standpoint of the scholar
does not escape him, but he insists upon the "utmost integrity of
effort." 9 Noting that "our knowledge is insecure," he invokes a chal-
lenge from Lord Richard Burdon Haldane:
But we can discriminate quality in what we find before us .... Of
knowledge we can at best master only a fragment. But if that fragment
has been reached by endeavour that is sufficiently passionate, the
struggle towards it yields a sense of quality, of quality in the very
Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J.
IN'L L. 188 (1968).
7 As recounted by Dean Dillard in Commentary, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 532 (1967).
8Dillard, A Tribute to Charles 0. Gregory, 53 VA. L. REV. 759, 760 (1967).
9 Honor: Concept and Reality, Address by Professor Dillard to Entering Students of
the'University of Virginia, Sept. 20, 1954 at 3.
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effort made, which stands for us as being what we care for beyond
everything else, as being for us truth, whatever else may not be
truth .... 10
The focus of inquiry recommended by Dean Dillard is as compre-
hensive and realistic as even the most perfectionistic might demand. Law
is, he finds, "pervasively concerned" with the whole "human condition,"
including all "the manifold pressures and reactions of human beings." 1
The location of law in "its environment" and the "asking how it works,"
he suggests, "brings into the picture the relation of law to politics,
sociology, economics, anthropology, ethics, and a host of other disci-
plines" and must require "empirical studies of all kinds designed to
nibble away at areas darkened by ignorance, superstition, and preju-
dice." 12 The conception of law which infuses these suggestions extends
beyond that of "a mere body of autonomous rules abstracted from the
institutional apparatus" giving them "authority" and "meaning" to the
whole process of decision in which such rules are employed in shaping
and affecting community values.' 3 In rejecting the position that law
should be defined as "norms formulated in words which decision-
makers feel, or should feel, impelled to obey," he offers, explicitly on
behalf of the "advocates of a policy-oriented approach," an eloquent and
insightful statement:
To ask, however tentatively, "What are rules?" is unwittingly to en-
dow them with a kind of reality or existence, even a metaphysical
existence, which is illusory. Rules of law do not "exist" in the sense
in which a tree or a stone or the planet Mars might be said to exist.
True, they may be articulated and put on paper and in that form they
exist, but, whatever their form, they are expressed in words which are
merely signs mediating human subjectivities. They represent and
arouse expectations which are capable of being explored scientifically.
The "law" is thus not a "something" impelling obedience; it is a con-
stantly evolving process of decision making and the way it evolves
will depend on the knowledge and insights of th6 decision makers. So
viewed, norms of law should be considered less as compulsive com-
10 Id. at 8.
11 Dillard, Supplementary Comment on the Humanities and the Law, 17 J. LEGAL ED.
68, 69 (1964).
12 Dillard, Book Review, 38 VA. L. REv. 703, 704-05 (1952).
Is Dillard, Law and Conflict: Some Current Dilemmas, 24 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 177,
188 (1967). Cf. the general emphasis of Some Aspects of Law and Diplomacy, 91
RECmIL DES Couas 447 (1957).
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mands than as tools of thought or instruments of analysis. Their im-
pelling quality will vary greatly depending on the context of applica-
tion, and, since the need for stability is recognized, the norms may
frequently provide a high order of predictability. But this is referable
back to the expectations entertained and is not attributable to some
existential quality attaching to the norms themselves. In other words,
our concept of "law" needs to be liberated from the cramping assump-
tion that it "exists" as a kind of "entity" imposing restraints on the
decision maker.14
The largest community in which Dean Dillard would locate, and make
inquiry about, law is, as suggested in the quotation above, the community
of the whole of mankind. The broad reach of his aspiration is excellently
indicated in his presidential address to the American Society of Interna-
tional Law:
I would suppose that if we were to identify the syndromes of ac-
celerated change in the twentieth century, in contrast to those of the
nineteenth, we would signal out for special emphasis: (1) the chang-
ing nature of international conflict owing to the pervasively felt
impact of Soviet ideology wedded to organized power, i.e., the fact
that Karl Marx is wedded to Peter the Great; (2) the rising expecta-
tions of the masses of the world symbolized by the emergence of so
many new nations in so short a time; (3) the quickening of the
conscience of the world with respect to racial discrimination; and
finally (4) the splitting of the atom with its attendant consequences in
weapon systems. Each of these has created its own distinctive set of
problems and has challenged anew law's capacity to help mediate
conflicting pressures.'
The intellectual tasks recommended by Dean Dillard would, similarly,
appear to include all those indispensable to effective policy invention and
evaluation. The necessity for goal clarification is inherent in his insistence
that law is "value oriented" and has the function of so ordering human
relationships "as to naximize values that are worthwhile." "G He observes
that "every decision incorporates a value judgment which is no less
intrusive for being hidden" and finds this "true even when custom has
14Dillard, The Policy-Oriented Approach to Law, 40 V.Ak. Q. Rzv. 626, 629 (1964).
15 Dillard, Conflict and Change: The Role of Law, 1963 At. Soc'y INT'L L. Poec. 50,
66.
l6Diard, Law and Conflict: Some Current Dilemmas, 24 WASH. & LEz L. REv. 177,
179-80 (1967).
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crystallized to a point of conditioning the expectations of actors since
adherence to custom is itself a value to be weighed." ' 7 He answers the
pragmatist who demands to know how a rule "works" by suggesting
"that it is impossible to tell how a rule works without some notion of
what it is working toward, i.e., without some notion of end or pur-
pose." 18 Though he notes "how stultifying a sense of tradition can be
when uninformed by certain attributes," 19 a sense of the importance of
the "insights gained from grappling with past decisions and legislative
enactments and the study of the conditions which gave them birth" is
endemic throughout his work.2' The need, he says, is "for what might
be called historic perspective leading to a deepened understanding of
purposes and methods," attended by a sifting out of "the demands which
are ephemeral while recognizing those that are likely not only to
emerge but endure." 21 He emphasizes the importance of scientific study
of the conditions affecting decision, in decrying the "assumption that the
significance of behavior can somehow be revealed by a process of
analysis which avoids the tough job of probing beneath the surface
manifestations of behavior to see what kinds of motives inspired
it. . 22 In similar vein, he writes:
We cannot expect to clarify a stuttering dialogue unless we dig be-
neath the surface manifestations of disputes in search of the underlying
criteria which form the basis for our legal as well as our ethical and
historical judgments. By airing these criteria and putting them in the
public domain, we may not only narrow the area of disagreement
but expose the kind of dogmatism that confuses fact with fancy and
substitutes "stereotypes for sense and rage for reason."
S
The need for conscious and deliberate contemplation of probable future
developments Dean Dillard variously notes. "It is," he asserts, "of course,
disingenuous to speak of the 'lessons' of the past if by doing so we as-
sume that an elusive future will conveniently accommodate itself to
17 Dillard, Tribute to Philip C. Jessup and Sorne Contnents on International Adjudi-
cation, 62 COLuM,. L. REv. 1138, 1145 (1962).
Is Dillard, Book Review, 5 J. LEGAL ED. 387, 389 (1953).
"I Dillard, Law and Conflict: Some Current Dilenmnas, 24 AV, Asu. & LEE L. Rav. 177
(1967).
2o Dillard, Minds and Moods, 44 VA. Q. Rav. 51, 58 (1968).
21 Dillard, Law and Learning, 49 VA. L. REv. 647, 657 (1963).
2 2 Dillard, Book Review, 52 AM. J. IN'L L. 558, 559 (1958).
23 Dillard, Law and Conflict: Somne Current Dilennnas, 24 WVK.sH. & L. Rav. 177, 202
(1967).
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our expectations." 2 4 Similarly, he cautions that the "smell of future
trouble" be "not stifled by over-familiarity with past dangers." 25 His
prescription for management of the "difficult art" of knowing "how
to separate the signals of the future from the noise of the present" is
"a feeling for history, including the history of ideas," which "is not
numbed by an obsession with the present." 26 The case for deliberate in-
vention and assessment of new alternatives he makes most eloquently:
It is here submitted that the lawyer today must draw upon a kind
of intellectual resource that puts a higher premium on "imagination"
than was true a half a century ago. "Imagination," as its etymology
suggests, may be characterized as a capacity to recognize new sets
of relations. The dictionaries are fairly uniform in defining it as an
intellectual power which forms images of objects not present to the
senses. Some add that it is the power to perceive in their entirety
elements previously perceived only separately, while others accent the
ability to create new ideas or to combine old ones in new forms.27
In an earlier incarnation Dean Dillard was modestly distressed by
an alleged dilemma of having to weigh "conflicting interests" in the
absence of a "common denominator to reduce them to" or "scales to
weigh them with." 28 In more recent writings, however, he unhesitatingly
proclaims the need for the postulation, as contrasted with the derivation,
of a comprehensive set of goal values, and he explicitly joins with the
present writers in recommending postulation of the basic goal values of
human dignity. In a democracy, he insists, order alone "is not an exclu-
sive value." 29 "What we seek in a democracy," he adds, "is not merely
order but good order, that is, order directed to a purpose." This purpose
he finds in "the promotion of the dignity and the worth of the indi-
vidual," and he defines "a democracy" as "a commonwealth of mutual
deference where there is a full opportunity to mature talent into socially
creative skill free from artificially imposed and non-rational discrimina-
tion." It is not of course Dean Dillard's expectation, any more than that
of present writers, that the basic goal values of human dignity can be
24Dilard, Power and Persuasion: The Role of Military Government, 42 YALE REv. 212,
225 (1953).25 Dillard, Minds and Moods, 44 VA. Q. REv. 51,57 (1968).
2d. at 59.
27Dillard, Law and Learning, 49 VA. L. REv. 647, 656 (1953).
2 sDillafd, Book Review, 27 VA. L. REv. 568, 570 (1941).
29 Dillard, Law and Conflict: Some Current Dilemmas, 24 WASH. & LEr L. REv. 177,
180-81 (1967). The several quotations which follow are from this same source.
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clarified and applied in specific instances by simple definitional exercises;
the detailed specification of such values for rational application in spe-
cific instances must require, insofar as economy permits, the disciplined
and systematic performance of all the various intellectual tasks indicated
above. The principal function for which our contemporary community
maintains the structures and processes of law, Dean Dillard rightly as-
serts, is to secure this clarification and implementation of basic values.30
In "the public domain," as contrasted with the domain of private choice,
"the State must rationally justify its choices by reference to some con-
ception of democracy." He adds:
In its ultimate reach, this requirement is the citizen's protection against
dictatorial tyranny. A choice is nonrational, i.e., it is arbitrary, if it is
not "reasonably" related to an end which society thinks good. Society
"thinks" through its representatives in accordance with constitutional
procedures which, under our system, lodge the ultimate decision in
the electorate through the amending power and place the more im-
mediate and practical decision in the legislative branch as to most
matters and in the courts through the power of judical review as to
constitutionally protected civil rights31
In presenting these samplings from Dean Dillard's writings about
jurisprudence it has not been our purpose to attempt to constrain his
thought into a formal systematization that his genius might find alien. It
has been our purpose only to document that he has already, without any
pretense toward system, made most substantial contributions toward
clarifying the major features of the kind of configurative, policy-
oriented jurisprudence urgently needed for transforming legal education
into "conscious, efficient, and systematic training for policy making" in
a "free and productive commonwealth of mutual deference." One
happy fact attending his retirement from the duties of the deanship,
ceremonialized in this issue of the Law Review, is that new leisure may
afford him opportunity to crystallize his pervasive insights into more
comprehensive expression. Like the editors of the Virginia Law Review,
we yield to none in our dedication to Dean Dillard, and certainly would
be among the last to dare, or wish, to say a requiem over his abounding
creativity.
Legal education in coming years can be expected to move in harmony
30 See Dillard, Freedom of Choice and Democratic Values, 38 VA. Q. REv. 410 (1962).
31 ld. at 421.
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with the theory of law made so persuasively articulate in Dean Dillard's
essays and so impressively manifest in his career. The curriculum will
provide occasion to acquire competence in recognizing the interplay
of legal process with social process, and in perceiving how knowledge
of the past and estimates of the future are linked to the goals and strate-
gies of public policy. As value outcomes are specified through the years,
students and practitioners alike will improve their judgment and skill in
timing both the occasion and the degree of appropriate change. In such
a perspective it will be evident when the situation is unripe for innova-
tion, or by contrast when innovations of moderate or even radical
scale are indicated. Criteria will be apparent for determining when the
opposite strategy is gradualist (sometimes called incremental), and
when the moment is auspicious for sweeping termination of old abuses
or for taking advantage of great new opportunities. Aware of the
delicate balance between formal authority and effective control, the
several phases of decision will be appraised in ways that conserve or
adapt the structures of public and civic order to the postulate of life
with dignity. Happily the initiatives of Dean Dillard are more likely to
mark the beginning than the end of an era.
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